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In a work entitled The Figure of the Theater, American literary
theorist David Marshall has traced the role played by the image of the
theatrical relation between spectators and spectacle as a metaphor for
everyday social relations within a group of predominantly eighteenth
century writers. Crossing genres, Marshall examines works of
philosophers. the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Adam Smith and
novelists, Daniel Defoe and George Eliot. l With Adam Smith,
Marshall is interested in particular in the way the theatrical metaphor
underlies the theory of sympathy developed in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments.
The chapter on Smith seems to have been of particular importance
for Marshall. Two years after the first book he published another,
The Surprising Effects of Sympathy, again crossing between
philosophical works-now of Diderot and Rousseau-and dramatic
and novelistic ones-Marivaux and Mary Shelley.2 In the
introduction to this second work Marshall writes of his earlier book:
'I included Smith in the book because his treatise on sympathy
seemed to me to be about the problem of theatricality but I began to
sense that the texts which reOected or reOected on the problem of
theatricality might also be addressing the question of sympathy.... By
the time I returned to Marivaux and Rousseau, as well as to Diderot,
Du Bas. and other eighteenth-century French authors, I knew that my
subject had become the interplay of theater and sympathy.'3
Marshall's initial linking of Shaftesbury and Smith and his later
linking of theatricality and sympathy seem highly significant from the
point of view of aesthetics and moral philosophy. With these thinkers
Marshall has chosen the philosophers who stand at the beginning and
end of the tradition of moral and aesthetic sense theory. This tradition
1 New York. 1986.
2 Chicago. 1988.
3 The Surprising Effecls of Sympalhy. p.2.
82
Paul Redding
commences with Shaftesbury's postulation of a particular type of
sense for the discrimination of aesthetic and moral qualities.4 For
Shaftesbury, our aesthetic and ethical judgments are importantly
linked, and the aesthetic and ethical qualities of which they judge
are treated as real. that is. in the world. Within English language
philosophy. aesthetics and moral theory later parted ways and both
tended to lose the 'realism' of Shaftesbury's approach. Recently.
however, aesthetic and moral realism have returned.
As Marshall docs not return to Shaftesbury, he does not explicitly
address the relation between sympathy and theatricalization of social
relations in his writings. Also, given the nature of his analysis,
neither does he look at Shaftesbury or Smith within the wider
contexts of their philosophical projects or the cultural dynamics of
their time. In this essay I attempt to develop Marshall's analysis of
Shaftesbury in this direction.
Marshall traces through a number of Shaftesbury's texts a recurrent
concern, manifested not only in the content but also dramatized in the
form of his writing, with the problematic ethical relationship existing
between the writer and reader of publicly circulated texts.
In a number of places Shaftesbury returns to the theme of a type
of corruption or perversion of communication which he perceives
in the modern commodification of writing. The writer communicating
with a mass and unknown audience is lured into a type of unauthentic
playing to the crowd: 'The intercourse between the author and reader'
writes Marshall, 'is cast as so much strutting, solicitation, seduction
- what Shaftcsbury calls 'the coquetry of a modern author' '.5 Such
authorial coquetry corrupts true communication by degenerating into
a 'narcissistic appeal on the author's part to the reader's own
narcissism, an appeal for the reader's favor.' Shaftesbury condemns
the modern author's parading on the public stage and his solicitation
of the reader as an audience for his 'immoderate' talk about himself.
4 Shaftcsbury's essays were collected and first puhlishcd in 1711. See Anthony.
Earl of Shaftesbury. Characteristics ofMen, Manners. Opinion. Times. cd. John
M. Robinson. introd. Stanley Grean. Indianapolis. 1964. l11e moral sense
tradition innuenced by Shaftcsbury traverses the Scottish Enlightenment.
foranl:is Hutcheson and David Hume are perhaps il~ two most centra) figures.
5 The Surprising Effects of Sympathy. p.27. The quotation is from
Characteristics. vol. 1. p. 1J 1. All further references to this work will be given
in the te)!.t as volume and page numbers.
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Marshall highlights Shaftesbury' s various rhetorical stratagems
with which he attempts to prevent this degeneration of his own
relation to the reader. In a number of works he adopts the letter form
in which the communication pretends it is really for some single
addressee. The appearance of the text in the market place and the
author on the public stage is construed as a type of accidental by-
product, the result of an act by a printer. rather than the author him-
self. Elsewhere he advocates and employs dramatic dialogue so as to
avoid using the first person pronoun and so presenting himself before
his audience. Finally, in his Miscellaneous Reflections, he talks about
himself in the third person, claiming to 'descant cursorily upon some
late pieces of a British author' and serve as 'critic and interpreter to
this new writer' in order to 'correct his f1egm. and give him more of
the fashionable air and manner of the world' (2: 160-61).6
Shaftesbury's worry about such 'theatricalized' relations within
written culture clearly is grounded in a more general concern with that
type of corruption of everyday life in which lives are lived out entirely
within the opinion of others. Here. one lives, in a self-alienated way,
as it were, as an actor whose actions are predominantly for the gaze of
others. We might read Shaftesbury here as gesturing towards that
historical diagnosis of distinctly modern forms of intersubjectivity.
forms linked to the emergence of market society, made with such
precision later in the century by Rousseau.
Here, however, I wish to narrow the focus and examine the
significance of such theatricalization of communicative relations
from the point of view of Shaftesbury's critical orientation to his
contemporary religious and political culture. As has been often
pointed out, Shaftesbury held distinctly pantheistic philosophico-
religious views and saw his contemporary world as threatened by two
linked forms of life and thought: from a type of Hobbesian atheism on
the one hand and from a transcendent theism from the other. 7 While
6 Such a technique enacts a device he advocates in the earlier work Soliloquy
or Advice to an Author where he urges solitary discoursing with oneself by
splitting oneself into two.
7 The interpretation of Shaftesbury as a pantheist. somewhat like Spinoza. has
been common among German interpreters. On the whole English language
commentaries have tended to cast him as a deist. Robert Toole ('Shaftesbury on
God and his Relationship to the World', International Studies in Philosophy, 8
(1976): 81-1(0) surveys these two views and convincing argues for the former.
Stanley Grean in Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics. Athens,
Ohio, 1967, argues that he is a 'panentheist' rather than a 'pantheist' but. I
believe, fails to make much of the distinction.
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most of his contemporaries saw these as opposed cultural forms, for
Shaftesbury they were, it seems, almost variants of the same thing.
Both had accepted or were in the process of accepting the mechanical
view of nature which had emerged out of the new science. In both
cultural forms, God had gone from nature, either killed off or in exile,
and nature was left as dead, mechanical, meaningless. Shaftesbury's
pantheism split the difference by identifying god with nature in an
effort to ward off the nihilism shared by the other views. From the
pantheistic perspective the theatricalization of communication will be
viewed as a corruption underlying patterns of those natural
'sympathetic' relations necessary for the underlying unity of the
pantheist's world.
While certainly an unorthodox outlook in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, pantheism was, nevertheless, far from
unknown. The late renaissance thinker Giordano Bruno had
advocated a pantheistic metaphysics which was modern in the
sense that it incorporated the new Copernican cosmology, while in
the seventeenth century, pantheism received a distinctly modern
expression in the philosophy of Spinoza. Throughout these centuries
pantheistic views were also not uncommonly found among the radical
Protestant sects and tended to be associated with democratic and
republican political views.
According to the historian Margaret C. Jacob, there was a revival
of pantheistic views in England in the last decade of the seventeenth
century, again in association with republican political views. 8 Such
ideas, she argues, formed the basis of a radically Republican cultural
and political movement, a 'radical enlightenment', which later crossed
the channel and proceeded to run beneath the surface of the more
moderate enlightenment culture of the eighteenth century. The English
movement in the 1690s was centred on a London based group of
intellectuals, linked to the neo-Harringtonian 'old Whigs' unhappy
with the Revolution settlement of 1689 and the dominance of their
'court' Whig rivals. 9 Shaftesbury, grandson of the First Earl, the
leading oppositional political figure of the restoration period, served
as a member of parliament between 1695 and 1698 and moved
8 See Margaret C. Jacoh. Thc Radical EnJighteruncnt: Pantheists, Frccmasons ami
Republicans, London, t981.
<) See J. G. A. Pocock, The Varieties of Whiggism from Exclusion to Reform'
in Virtuc, COII/merce arui Hiswry. Camhridge, t 9R5.
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in those circles Jacob identifies as at the centre of the radical
enlightenment. 10 Of particular interest is Shaftesbury's association
with the shadowy figure of John Toland. a political activist and
propagandist who edited the works of both the earlier republican
political theorist James Harrington and the Renaissance pantheist
Giordano Bruno. 11 It was Toland who, in 1699, published
Shaftesbury's first work, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Meril. 12
It was also Toland who coined the term 'pantheism'.
Whatever the details of its exact influences, Shaftcsbury's
pantheism seems to owe much to ancient Stoic cosmology. In the
Inquiry and again in later works, Shaftesbury treats the living world
holistically as a unified ecological system: the complementariness and
interdependence perceivable between the parts of a single living body
is repeated between the members of a species and then between
different species and so on. Working one's way outward, one finally
encounters a 'system of all things, a universal nature' (I: 246).
As for the Stoics, for Shaftesbury the human living subject is
essentially part of such a world, standing, like other living things, in
necessary relations to things around it. Like any other animal which
has 'relation to some other being or nature besides his own' or which
'points beyond himself' the human being will 'undoubtedly be
esteemed a part of some other system' (1: 245). And this characteristic
of 'pointing beyond itself' applies to human mental life as well.
Conceived as already existing within necessary perceptual and
cognitive relations to those other things forming part of the system to
which it belongs, the human mind as conceived by Shaftesbury is a
very different thing from that of the modern, indi vidualist, Cartesian
view which had been consolidating its grip on European culture since
the mid seventeenth century.
10 Robert Voitle. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury. 1671-1713. Baton Rogue, La..
1984, provides a comprehensive account of Shaftesbury's political and cultural
affiliations.
11 On Toland see Jacob. The Radical Enlightenment, as well as Robert E.
Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy: A Study in Adaptation,
Cambridge. Mass., 1982. Pocock calls Toland the 'main actor in creating ...
"the Whig canon" of seventeenth-century writers'. 'lbe Varieties of Whiggism'
p.232.
12 That the open espousal of controversial religious views was still dangerous is
attested to by the fate of "lbomas Aikenhead who was burned at the stake in
Edinburgh in 1697, only two years before the appearance of the Inquiry. for
attacking the doctrine of the Trinity. It is not unexpected then that Shaftesbury's
views might often be cloaked in the outward garb of a more moderate theism.
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From the Cartesian point of view, the mind is substantially
different from the body. As not in time and space, the mind is figured
as staring at the world from no particular place in it. Stanley Cavell
has commented on the relevance of the theater as an image of such a
relation. 13 Watching a play I am observing events within a time and
space which I do not inhabit. And if I observe the world as if from
nowhere in it, I, qua mind, can never be present to it despite the fact
that it can be present to me. Hence arises one of the classic problems
of modern philosophy, the problem of 'other minds'. Given the fact
that all I can perceive of others is their bodies, how can I know that
those bodies 'contain' minds?
But within the pantheistic framework, since the minds of others
cannot be conceived as substantially distinct from their bodies, and
since the embodied human mind itself points beyond itself to other
things, there is no metaphysical barrier preventing individual mind
from directly engaging with other minds. It is for this reason that
Shaftesbury can describe the mind as a 'spectator or auditor of other
minds' (l: 251), a conception which is essentially unthinkable from
the modern individualist Cartesian perspective. In fact it is these
relations between embodied minds which accounts for the individual
mind's participation within the divine mind, a mind which is
essentially simply the system of all living minds.
It is this idea of the individual mind as immanent within a living
enminded system that allows Shaftesbury to be a realist about
aesthetic and moral qualities. The individual human mind reaches out
to engage with other things in the world from its rootedness in the
human body and from the interested perspective of this body: 'We
know that every creature has a private good and interest of his own,
which Nature has compelled him to seek, by all the advantages
afforded him within the Compass of his make. We know that there is
in reality a right and a wrong state of every creature, and that his
right-one is by nature forwarded and by himself affectionately sought'
(I: 243). But as each individual is a part of a larger living system, it is
not surprising that we find in humans, besides their private affections
working toward their own private good, natural social affections
directed towards the good of the system of which they arc a part, the
system that is the condition of their individual existence and identity.
From this perspective we now have a very different conception to
13 Sce Stanley Cavell. 'Thc Avoidance of Lovc' in Musl We Mean Whal We Say?
Cambridge. 1976.
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that found in Cartesianism concerning the experience of values. The
individual perceives the world from the perspective of his or her own
interests and thus finds affectively discerned qualities immediately
present in it: the embodied mind 'feels the soft and harsh, the
agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections; and finds as a foul and
fair, a harmonious and dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any
musical numbers or in the outward forces and representations of
sensible things' (I: 251).
From the Cartesian point of view, the attribution to the world of
qualities like these must be based on an error. These qualities are
subjective, are actually in the subject's mind in the way that feelings
are, they are not in the world. Science, that is, mathematical physics,
reveals how the world in fact is, and science docs not discover in the
world qualities like these; our experience of things as soft or harsh or
fair or foul involves the retrospective projection onto a featureless
physical world of feelings produced in the mind by that world.
Such was the view of all qualities other than those 'primary' ones
dealt with by science which was incorporated into English philosophy
via Shaftesbury's tutor, John Locke. In the mechanistic Newtonian
world view which combined with Anglican theology and came to
dominate English high culture at the end of the seventeenth century,
the physical world is devoid not only of aesthetic or morally relevant
qualities, it is devoid of all life: all form and direction are imposed on
a dead world from without by a transcendent God. One might see
how such a view might appeal to the supporters of a centralized,
hierarchical state, and be antipathetic to the republican spirit. 14
Shaftesbury rejected both this view of the natural world and the
mind's relation to it. For him the feelings or affections, while in the
subject are not projected onto a featureless world in perception giving
it the illusion of quality. Rather, they are more the essential subjective
conditions for the apprehension of such qualities regarded as real. I5
14 But as what Shaftesbury seems to have meant by 'atheism' was the inability to
discern a meaningful order in the world, a state that we might think of now as
'nihilism', the Newtonian religion was almost a variant of atheism.
15 Recent revivals of moral realism based on a view of the subject as essentially
embodied and located in the world have a somewhat Shaftesburian flavour. Sec,
for example, Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics, Oxford,
1983. Charles Taylor in 'Self-interpreting animals' in Human Agency and
Language: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge, 1985, has, from a similar
perspective, explored the role of emotions a~ 'modes of affective disclosure' of
the world. lbere has as yet been little reassessment of Shafteshury against this
sort of background-J. D. Filonowicz, 'Ethical Sentimentalism Revisited',
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He thus rejects the very framework presupposed by the error theory
of qualitative perception. Again, it is Shaftesbury's criticism of the
religious presuppositions of the mechanical· philosophy which is at
work here. For Descartes and Galileo and subsequently Locke, Boyle
and Newton, the idea of a transcendent deity provided the model of a
type of 'spectatorial' knowing of the world from some point outside
it, free of its conditioning. Science approximates God's knowledge of
the world and God's will is the source of objective moral value. By
rejecting the idea of a transcendent deity, Shaftesbury thereby rejects
the idea of an 'absolute viewpoint' from which the world can be
perceived free of subjective conditions. We can, of course, fall into
particular errors in our affective discernment of values; and the error
will be, in some sense, due to the subjectivity and limitedness of
one's view. But this is to be interpreted as following on from
perceiving the world from the vantage-point of one's private
affections alone to the detriment of one's natural social ones. This is
why a culture will have to tutor the individual in the discernment of
the right feelings and why aesthetic and moral sensibilities are so
intimately linked.
Such a theory as this will of course need some account of how
this coordination of private and social affections is possible and it is
here in Shaftesbury that we encounter the crucial concept of
sympathy.
Ancient Stoics like Marcus Aurelius had thought of the cosmos as
pervaded by a universal harmony or sympathy between all things.
While Shaftesbury toys with such ideas, his idea of sympathy is
basically tied to human communication. Thus among the natural
public affections is to be found the 'enjoyment of good by
communication. A receiving it, as it were, by reflection, or by way of
participation in the good of others' (I: 298). Such 'pleasures of
sympathy' are communicatively received 'from accounts and relations
of such happiness, from the very countenances, gestures, voices and
sounds, even of creatures foreign to our kind, whose signs of joy and
contentment we can any way discern' (ibid.). We can now see how
History of Philosophy Quarterly (, (1989): 189-206. is a notable exception. 1\
reassessment of some of those influenced in this way by Shaftesbury.
particularly Hutcheson and Bume. is. however. underway. See. for example.
David Fate Norton. David Hume: Common·sense Moralist. Sceptical
Metaphysician. Princeton. 191\2.
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the individual can be thought of as unproblematically able, in vision
or hearing, to read the minds of others. Shaftesbury's concept of
sympathy proceeds from the same foundations as his value realism.
The mind is never outside the world, viewing as through a window, it
is from the start in the world, embodied and communicatively
engaged with other minds with whom it shares affections. 16
Communication is thus, for Shaftesbury, the medium of that
sympathy which, resonating through the social whole, is responsible
for whatever harmony of social existence is possible. And so it is not
surprising that we might find in his writings that obsessive concern
which Marshall has discerned-a concern with the effects of those
dramatic changes in the scope and media of public communication
occurring in his time. Communication may be the key to
understanding the Stoic notion of sympathy, but communication had
certainly been transformed since antiquity.
In Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury represents dialogue rather
than monologue as the natural context for reasoning: 'Vicissitude is a
mighty law of discourse and mightily longed for by mankind. In
matters of reason, more is done in a minute or two, by way of
question and reply, than by a continued discourse of whole hours.
Orators are fit only to move the passions: and the power of
declamation is to terrify, exalt, ravish or delight, rather than satisfy or
instruct' (I, 49). And yet dialogue is not the predominant form of
discourse in the modern world. In The Moralists, Shaftesbury has
Philocles comment on the way 'we moderns who abound so much in
treatises and essays are so sparing in the way of dialogue, which
heretofore was found the politest and best way of managing even the
graver subjects' (2: 6).17
However, it would seem that the distinction between dialogue and
monologue cannot be taken entirely literally: dialogical relations can,
16 It is on the hasis of the same sort of reading of sympathy that revisionist~ like
David Norton read Burne as a value realist. (See fn. 15).
17 In Soliloquy, Shafteshury comments on the way that the ancient dialogue form
looks ridiculous in modem garh and comments: 'Thus dialogue is at an end. The
ancients could see their own fal:es. hut we l:annol.' (1, 136) Shaftesbury's overt
meaning here is that we cannot portray ourselves as the agents of dialogue and
so cannot see our own faces in this type of literature. Perhaps this can also be
read, however, as commenting on the effects on communicative activity hrought
about hy the creation of the press and the development of mass literacy and a
reading public. Philosophical communication is no longer something that goes
on predominantly in face to face ex.change. It is only typeface that stares hack at
the modern philosophical 'dialogist'.
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as it were, insert themselves into monologue. In A Letter Concenzing
Enthusiasm Shaftesbury notes how the imagined response of an
audience can effect expression: 'Our modern wits are more or less
raised by the opinion they have of their company, and the idea they
form to themselves of the persons to whom they make their
addresses. A common actor of the stage will inform us how much a
full audience of the better sort exalts him above the common pitch'
(I: 8). Shaftesbury uses this to reconstruct a modern version of the
notion of the muse. In his monological 'letter' addressed and
dedicated to an unnamed Lord, he is able to 'raise' his thoughts by
virtue of addressing them to a 'great man of a more than ordinary
genius, whose imagined presence may inspire me with more than
what I feel at ordinary hours' (I: 8-9). The paradox is, as Marshall
points out, Shaftesbury's letter is no ordinary letter to an individual
but a printed text circulated on the market. put on the public stage to
be read by an unknown audience.
But what is the actual problem with the writer appearing on the
public stage before an unknown audience? Might not we see this as an
instance of the universal sympathy for which the modern Stoic is
searching? The problem here is that the universalization of relations
strains the very notion of sympathy. In Sensus Communis, he
contrasts sympathetic friendship with its 'consent or harmony of
minds ... mutual estccm and reciprocallenderness and affection' from
'that common benevolence and charity which every Christian is
obliged to show towards all men .. .' (1: 61, note 1).18 That is, the
universalizing of relationships abstracts away from those very
qualities which allow particular nalures to sympathize with each other.
The issue of the particularity of those communicative relations
grounded in sympathy is raised elsewhere in the same work when
Shaftesbury, in differentiating the 'liberty of the club' from the
'freedom of public assemblies', defends the limitation of certain
forms of 'frankness of humour' to partiCUlar communicative conlexl~.
The 'club' can provide the context for the greater liberty of speech
because it is a realm of 'gentlemen and friends who know one another
perfectly well'. Again it is in the maintenance of dialogue which is at
issue here: "Tis a breach of Ihe harmony of public conversation to
18 ]be passage continues 'and in particular towards his fcllow Christians. his
ncighbour. hrother and kindred. of whatever dcgrec' (I: 67 notc 1). That is.
whcrc Christianity does I>ring particularity into iLs cthics it is not bascd in that
'natural harmony of minds' found within the voluntary rclations of friendship
I>ut imposed hy external factors.
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take things in such a key as is above the common reach, puts others to
silence, and robs them of their privilege of turn. But as to private
society, and what passes in select companies, where friends meet
knowingly, and with that very design of exercising their wit, and
looking freely into all subjects, I see no pretence for anyone to be
offended at the way of raillery and humour, which is the very life of
such conversations .. .' (l: 53).
In Shaftesbury's concerns over the 'coquetry' of the modern
author we can detect the structure of the corruption that threatens
modem communication. Here communication is not being fuelled by
the social affections: the universalization of the communicative
relations means that the communication can no longer be motivated by
the pleasures of sympathetic company. All that is now left to motivate
the communication are the private egoistic affections and so the
process now comes to be driven by the immoderate desire for fame
and notoriety. The expansion of the public communicative realm,
while promising to expand the channels of sympathy, actually
threatens to destroy them by subverting them into instruments of
private self-affections. In the Inquiry Shaftesbury talks of the
hypertrophy of 'an honest emulation or love of praise' when it
'breaks into an enonnous pride and ambition' (I: 327). An honest and
moderate love of praise is by no means antipathetic to the public
interest just as a moderate degree of desire for wealth is not
antipathetic to the common good. But the threat posed to the common
good is particularly acute when the fabric of communication is
endangered by the private interests because this represents a threat to
the medium of sympathy itself.
Shaftesbury's holistic and pantheistic framework allows a place for
actions to be motivated by social affections. From the Cartesian based
mechanistic point of view, however. all affective motivations are
necessarily reduced to private self-interest. Sympathy becomes based
on self-affections. Hobbes had set the model for this reduction. 'Pity'
he said 'is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves
proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity.' 19 This idea
19 'Ibomas Hobbes. EnE;fjsh Works. cd. Molesworth. vol IV. p. 44. 'Ibe master of
this denationary analysis of moral sentiment is the Due de la Rochefuueauld.
Maxim 264 is typical: 'Pity is often feeling our own suffering in those of
others. a shrewd precaution against misfortunes that may hefall us. ... •
Maxims. II. Leonard Tancock. Penguin Dooks. t959.
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was to be repeated in the eighteenth century by Mandeville in his
influential critique of Shaftesbury's notion of natural social affections
and was also the basis of Adam Smith's somewhat Newtonian
reworking of the concept of sympathy in The Theory of the Moral
Sentiments. As Marshall demonstrates, Smith constructs his whole
theory of the moral sentiments on the basis of a theatricalised image of
social relations. One views the other as one views an actor on a stage
and in tum reflectively imagines oneself from their point of view, that
is as on stage oneself and acting for a viewer. Moral sentiments are to
be explained by the fact that the other serves not as a genuine other
but rather as a type of screen onto which one projects imagined states
of oneself. Sympathy becomes a disguised form of regard for the
self, not a genuinely moral concern for the suffering of another. Like
aesthetic qualities, qualities relevant for one's moral life, another
person's pain for example, become reduced to a state of the self,
one's own pain, projected onto an indifferent object.
Smith's reversal of the relations between sympathy and
theatricality signals the triumph of the Newtonian mechanistic
philosophy over Shaftesbury's pantheism. For Shaftesbury, the
theatricalised and egoistic relations of a self to another was a
constantly threatening degeneration of relations of sympathy. For
Smith they become the infrastructure and truth of the phenomena of
sympathy. Sympathy can be a primitive concept for Shaftesbury
because of his holistic starting point while self-interestedness
of motivation can be the primitive notion for Smith because of
his mechanistic one. We might read this as a result of the triumph
of a modern scientific metaphysics over a doomed attempt to
revive an ancient pantheistic one. But this would miss the
depth of Shaftesbury's critique. Shaftesbury is more 'moralist'
than 'metaphysician' and his pantheism should not be seen as a
metaphysical rival to science as much as a practical and therapeutic
response to modernity's own hypostatization of science into a secular
religion. as equally prone to fanatical degeneration as any other.
The dialogical form of Shaftesbury's The Moralists suggests how his
pantheistic vision should be regarded. In pan 3, Theocles, whose
rapturous hymn to nature articulates the pantheistic world-view (and
who has been traditionally thought as representing Shaftesbury's own
views) attempts in his rhapsodizing to convince the sceptical Philocles
of the perfect unity, goodness and beauty of a divine nature.
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PhilocIes' scepticism centres on his resistance to the pantheist's
treatment of evil. For the pantheist, the perfection of the whole of
nature must imply that the evil in it is only apparent. Such apparent
evil is actually redeemed by the contributory role it plays to the
goodness of the whole.
Throughout the work, Philocles has returned on numerous
occasions to the existence of human evil in the world. Unconvinced
by Theocles he tells him that his 'solutions ... of the ill appearances
are not perfect enough to pass for demonstration' (2: 108). TheocIes'
reply hangs on the unreasonableness of Philocles' demand for
demonstration: 'in an infinity of things, mutually relative, a mind
which sees not infinitely can sec nothing fUlly, and must therefore
frequently see that as imperfect which is itself in reality perfect. Are
the appearances then any objection to our hypothesis?' To PhilocIes'
reply that they are not 'whilst they remain appearances only' TheocIes
counters 'Can you then prove them to be any morc?' (ihid.)
The conception of philosophy dramatized here is a therapeutic
onc. Neither conversationalist is able to rationally generalize their
point of view in a way that it can explain away the other and so reject
its place in the dialogue. In an 'infinity of things, mutually relative'
there can be no point from which the wholc itself can be grasped and
so the pantheist cannot legitimately claim for himself a view of the
whole to dismiss his opponents claims. But from this point of view
neither can the opponent claim a position from which to assert the
ultimacy of human evil, such as the Hobbist view that all human
motivations are forms of individual self-seeking. What the pantheist
can do, however, is claim a place within the dialogue on the world as
no single point of view can have the final word.
The task the metaphysician sets himself is that of attaining a
conception of how the world actuall y is irrespecti ve of the subjective
conditions of its viewing. For the non metaphysical pantheist,
however, the task is 'how to gain that point of view whence prohahly
we may best discern; and how to place ourselves in that unbiased state
in which we are fittest to pronounce' (2: 31).
For hoth Theocles and Shaftesbury, the unbiased state aimed for
must always he within a form of sympathetic dialogue in which the
other's point of view plays a moderating and correcting role. In order
to sing his hymn to nature Theocles, accompanied by his skeptical
companion. has taken himself to a place in the woods to he inspired
by its genius. But his companion's presence is just as crucial as that
of the sylvan spirit. Midway through his rapturous hymn, TheocIes
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breaks off and reprimands PhilocIes for not having interrupted him.
'Have you at once given over your scrupulous philosophy, to let me
range thus at pleasure through these aerial spaces and imaginary
regions where my capricious fancy or easy faith hac; led me? I would
have you to consider better, and know, my PhilocIes, that I had never
trusted myself with you in this vein of enthusiasm, had I not relied on
you to govern it a little better' (2: 114).
TheocIes' admonition of PhilocIes suggests that rather than
merely serving as a device for articulating a pantheistic vision, the
notion of our essential embeddedness within dialogical relations to
others is Shaftesbury's essential concept. Like a number of recent
philosophers, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas to name
but two,20 Shaftesbury tries to develop some of the epistemological,
ethical and aesthetic consequences of this concept. His diagnosis
of the cultural, political and psychological dangers of a seducing
monological mass-communication, his view of the philosopher not as
an aspirant to a God's-eye-view of the universe but as a therapist of
disempowering degenerations of language, and his attention to the
dangers of a view of nature as dead and without intrinsic value and so
as potential raw material for our fantasies of total power over it, all
resonate within contemporary thought.
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